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Early globalizations: the integration of Asia in the world economy, 1800-1938 
By David Chilosi and Giovanni Federico 
Abstract 
 This paper contributes to the debate on globalization and the great divergence with a comprehensive 
analysis of the integration of Asia in the world market from 1800 to the eve of World War Two. We 
examine the patterns of convergence in prices for a wide range of commodities between Europe and 
the main Asian countries (India, Indonesia, Japan and China) and we compare them with 
convergence between Europe and the East Coast of the United States, hitherto the yardstick for the 
19
th
 century. Most price convergence occurred before 1870, mainly as a consequence of the abolition 
of the European trading monopolies with Asia, and, to a lesser extent, the repeal of duties on Atlantic 
trade.  After 1870, price differentials continued to decline thanks to falling freights and to better 
communication after the lay-out of telegraph cables. There was only little disintegration in the inter-
war years. 
 
Keywords: globalization; market integration; international trade; economic growth; Asia; nineteenth 
century. 
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   Standard economic theory holds that trade and market integration foster economic growth. Indeed, 
the era of the so-called first globalization, before World War One, coincided with a period of 
unprecedented economic growth in Europe and in its Western Offshoots (Maddison 2013). Yet, at the 
same time, the Asian countries (with the partial exception of Japan) fell increasingly behind the 
advanced European ones (Broadberry 2013), in spite of rapidly growing exports (Federico and Tena 
2013). Some scholars have tackled the paradox posed by this “great divergence” (Pomeranz, 2000) 
by pointing out that exports of primary products did benefit the Asian economies, but their effect was 
too small to foster economy-wide growth (Feuerwerker 1980,  1983, Booth 1988, Tomlison 1993, van 
der Eng 1996, Roy 2000, Brandt et al. 2013).  Others blame the colonial powers for forcing the Asian 
economies to export primary products, thus damaging their growth potential (Dutt 1969, Parthasarathi 
2011). For Williamson (2008, 2011, 2012, 2013), too, specialization in primary products damaged the 
long-term prospects for industrialization in the periphery. In his view, however, this specialization was 
the unintended consequence of market integration, which improved the terms of trade before the 
1870s. In the same vein, Allen (2011) argues that peripheral countries could have escaped this “curse 
of primary products” (Sachs and Warner 2001) only by adopting a coherent industrialization policy, 
which was conspicuously lacking in all Asian countries but Japan. 
    Testing these competing views about exports and economic growth entails a huge and very 
challenging research agenda. This paper contributes to this agenda by exploring price convergence, 
an essential component of integration, between Europe (United Kingdom, the Netherlands, or France) 
and the four main Asian countries, China, British India, the Dutch East Indies (henceforth Indonesia) 
and Japan from the beginning of the 19
th
 century to the eve of World War Two. In so doing, we fill in 
two key gaps in the literature on the integration of Asia in the world economy: we analyze the period 
1800-1870 and quantify the impact of the abolition of Western trading monopolies. Previous work has 
shown that price gaps were high before 1800 (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002, Rönnbäck 2009), 
narrowed after 1870 (O’Rourke and Williamson 2002, Hynes et al. 2012), and widened during the 
Great Depression (Hynes et al. 2012). However, no empirical research, to date, has dealt with the 
period 1800-1870. Yet, these years featured massive processes of integration both within Europe 
(Federico 2011, 2012) and in the Atlantic economy (Jacks 2005, Uebele 2011, Sharp and Weisdorf 
2013), raising the question of how does Asia compare? The same years also saw the abolition of the 
monopolies by the Western companies trading with Asia. Their demise must have boosted 
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integration, but we lack measures of the actual size of this effect, relative to those of the decline in 
duties and advancements in transport and communication technology.  
 We present our dataset in Section Two and discuss the patterns of price convergence in Section 
Three.  The key period of integration across routes was the early, rather than the late nineteenth 
century, while price differentials remained roughly stable in interwar years. Section Four deals with 
the main barriers to trade, focusing on the trading companies and on their abolition, while Section 
Five estimates the contribution of different causes (institutional change, fall in transport costs, trade 
liberalization and so on) to price convergence with a panel regression. In spite of the similarities in 
trends across oceans, the processes of integration had roots in different institutions: while in the 
Atlantic economy the repeal of duties was a key determinant, much of the price convergence between 
Asia and Europe was due to the demise of the British East India Company (EIC) and, to a lesser 
extent, the Dutch trading monopoly (Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij or NHM).  Section Six 
concludes. 
2)  The data-base 
  The quantitative analysis of integration faces a  trade-off between the quality of the data and their 
representativeness of changes in the overall market. In particular, as Federico (2012) argues, in order 
to produce reliable results, the price series should meet three conditions: 
i) The price ratios should refer to pairs of markets which were actually trading. Otherwise, price 
differentials can be lower than costs and move (quasi-) randomly within the band of commodity points.  
If markets trade and are efficient à la Fama (1970), in equilibrium price gaps must be equal to 
transaction costs, inclusive of monopoly mark-ups.  
ii) Each price series should refer to a specific quality rather than to the market average and each pair 
of series should refer to the same quality.  Otherwise, price gaps might reflect quality differentials, and 
any change in quality in a market might introduce spurious trends. 
iii) The commodities should be representative of the actual trade flows. Extending inferences from one 
product only (e.g. cereals), is tantamount to assume that that movements in transport costs, barriers 
to trade and market efficiency are similar across all traded goods 
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Table 1 
The data-base 
 
Period Market  Homogeneous quality? 
    Within markets Across 
  Origin Destination Origin Destination Markets 
Atlantic 
   
  
 Cotton 1801-1938 New York Liverpool Yes Yes Yes 
Wheat 1800-1937 New York London No No No 
Far East 
      Silk 1834-1877 Canton London Yes Yes Yes 
Silk 1874-1913 China London Yes Yes Yes 
Silk 1874-1914 China Lyon Yes Yes Yes 
Silk 1894-1914 Yokohama Lyon No No No 
Silk 1894-1938 Yokohama New York No No No 
Tea 1811-1831 Canton England No No Yes
a 
Tea 1820-1877 Canton London Yes Yes Yes 
India 
      Cotton 1796-1845 Calcutta London Yes Yes Yes 
Cotton 1867-1938 Bombay London Yes Yes Yes 
Indigo 1822-1931 Calcutta London Yes Yes Yes 
Jute 1844-1938 Calcutta London Yes Yes Yes 
Linseed 1846-1938 Calcutta London Yes Yes Yes 
Rapeseed 1871-1921 Calcutta London Yes Yes Yes 
Rice 1870-1938 Rangoon London Yes Yes Yes 
Saltpetre 1796-1853 Calcutta London Yes Yes Yes 
Silk 1796-1856 Calcutta London Yes Yes Yes 
Silk 1857-1877 Calcutta Lyon Yes Yes Yes 
Sugar 1796-1856 Calcutta London Yes Yes Yes 
Tea 1893-1931 Calcutta London Yes Yes Yes 
Wheat 1861-1931 Calcutta London Yes No No 
Indonesia 
     Coffee 1833-1913 Batavia Rotterdam No Yes No 
Pepper 1828-1938 Batavia Amsterdam No No No 
Rice 1848-1913 Batavia Amsterdam Yes Yes Yes 
Rubber 1913-1938 Batavia London Yes Yes Yes 
Sugar 1822-1938 Batavia London No No No 
Tea 1893-1938 Batavia Amsterdam Yes Yes Yes 
Tin 1863-1913 Batavia Amsterdam Yes No No 
Notes: 
a since all these figures refer to tea imported and sold at auctions by the East India Company, we expect the quality mix 
to be similar in the same year, but not necessarily across years. 
Sources: see Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B). 
 Unfortunately, we cannot examine integration on the import side because the data on prices of 
manufactures are very scattered and refer to different qualities. The data for primary products are 
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much more abundant and thus we have been able to collect series of prices for the same 
commodities in 26 pairs of markets (Table 1).
1
 
 All cities in our sample were major trading centers in their own countries, and trade statistics report 
bilateral trade of that specific good for about 93 per cent of the observations. Missing data are mostly 
scattered, which suggests failure to record rather than absence of trade. There is a small chance that 
absence of trade could be an issue in only about 2 per cent of the cases. Quality is homogeneous 
across markets (Yes in the relevant column) in the overwhelming majority of pairs, 22 out of 29 pairs. 
In two of the other cases, one series only can be considered as qualitatively homogeneous (Yes in 
the Column “within market”), but the quality surely differs between series (No the Column “across 
markets”), while in the remaining ones the quality differs between markets and changes in time in 
each market (No in all three columns). In short, in the worst case, homogeneity might be a problem at 
most for one fourth of cases. Last but not least, these products  accounted for about half or more of 
exports from India and Indonesia nearly the whole period, from United States before the Civil War and 
from China until 1900 (Table 2). The coverage is poor only for Japan.  
Table 2 
Shares of covered products on total exports (in percentage) 
 
China India Indonesia Japan 
United 
States 
1810 
 
26.4 84.0
a
 
 
34.8 
1830 
 
45.0
b
 67.1 
 
50.8 
1850 
 
40.5 76.3 
 
46.5 
1870 95.4 55.5 73.3 28.8 64.9 
1890 58.7 57.1 59.4 24.0 33.5 
1900 33.3 46.5 56.4 20.6 22.2 
1913 29.0 53.3 43.4 26.3 26.7 
1929 20.3 46.0 57.2 29.4 17.1 
1938 9.5 42.2 43.1 9.0 10.0 
Notes: 
a
 1823, 
b 
1828 
Sources: see Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B) and Federico and Tena (2013) 
 
Summing up, the data-base, though falling short of being perfect, can be considered as fit for our 
purposes. 
  
  
                                                          
1 For a more detailed discussion of our sources see Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B). We have considered a larger 
sample, but we have decided to drop some series (e.g. tobacco from Indonesia) which did not meet the minimum quality 
threshold. 
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3) The process of integration: a statistical analysis 
 Figure 1 
Price ratios: selected commodities 
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Notes: the price ratios are computed with the yearly means of import and export prices.  
Sources: see Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B). 
 
 A visual inspection of some representative series of price ratios (Figure 1) reveals that, on the one 
hand, as expected, the price ratios were fairly high at the beginning of the 19
th
 century and fell in the 
long run, with a spike during World War One.  On the other hand, the differentials differed hugely 
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among commodities at the same time (as seen in the vertical axis) and they often suddenly collapsed 
rather than steadily declined. 
More precise information on convergence can be obtained by estimating the equation (Razzaque et 
al., 2007): 
Δ Ln RP
i
=α + β TIME+ ψ ln RP
i
t-1+ φ ln Δ Ln RP
i
 t-1 +u       1)  
Where RP
i
 is the relative price of the i-th good between two markets and TIME is a linear trend. We 
compute the long-run rate of change as t=- (β/ψ). The error correction model coefficient ψ (ranging 
between -1 and 0) tests whether and estimates how rapidly price ratios return to this trend after a 
shock, while the lagged change in relative prices is added to address possible serial correlation.  We 
first run Equation 1) as a fixed effects panel for the whole sample and separately by country, 
considering jointly the (comparatively few) observations for the two Far Eastern countries, China and 
Japan.   
Table 3 
Long-run convergence: panel estimation 
  N 
Initial 
ratio 
Half-life 
(months) 
Rate (in 
percentage) 
Cumulated 
change (in 
percentage) 
All 1725 1.940 24 -0.443*** -46.72 
Atlantic 257 1.618 20 -0.401*** -42.46 
Far East 191 2.024 18 -0.520*** -52.22 
India 805 2.085 26 -0.501*** -50.89 
Indonesia 472 1.746 18 -0.402*** -37.25 
Significant at * 10 per cent; ** 5 per cent; *** 10 per cent. 
Notes: N=sample size. Fixed-effects estimation of equation 1) is used in all cases. 
Sources: see Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B). 
 
The results (Table 3) confirm the conventional wisdom: at the beginning of the series (which differed 
by product and route), European prices were on average double the Asian ones and by the end this 
difference had been cut by a half.  All rates are statistically significant and very similar across routes. 
The half-lives of shocks are comparatively quite high. One might sum up that the market was 
becoming increasingly integrated, but overall it had still a long way before becoming really efficient.  
However, such a conclusion might be a tad hasty:  it assumes stationary efficiency and linear price 
convergence with equal rates by product. We explore difference in timing of integration by running 
8 
 
separate panel regressions for five periods: the twilight of mercantilism (1796-1815), the early 
globalization (1815-1870), the heyday of globalization (1870-1913) and the war and interwar (1914-
1938). We also run for these periods a pooled group estimator, which allows rate of change to differ 
across products and then averages them (Table 4). 
Table 4  
Trends by period: panel regression 
 
 
N 
Initial 
ratio 
Half-life 
(months) 
Rate (in 
percentage) 
Cumulated 
change (in 
percentage) 
Pooled 
Group 
estimator 
Twilight of mercantilism (1796-1815) 
   
 
All 102 2.274 10 0.968 20.20 1.920 
Atlantic 27 1.215 9 3.249 62.81 4.855 
India 72 3.099 9 0.285 17.00 -0.195 
Early globalization (1815-1870) 
   
 
All 565 1.973 16 -0.896*** -38.92 -0.759** 
Atlantic 109 1.632 10 -0.678*** -31.12 -0.668*** 
Far East 48 2.245 12 -1.501** -55.55 -0.436 
India 263 2.125 17 -1.243*** -49.51 -1.506*** 
Indonesia 145 1.892 12 -0.504** -21.48 0.235 
Heyday of globalization (1870-1913) 
   
 
All 765 1.291 8 -0.418*** -16.44 -0.379*** 
Atlantic 88 1.129 12 -0.288*** -11.65 -0.230 
Far East 114 1.266 12 -0.334** -13.37 -0.235* 
India 330 1.326 7 -0.517*** -19.95 -0.461* 
Indonesia 233 1.311 8 -0.347*** -13.85 -0.359*** 
War and interwar (1914-1938) 
   
 
All 313 1.441 10 -1.128*** -23.71 -1.116*** 
Atlantic 37 1.084 7 -0.160 -3.78 -0.260 
Far East 27 1.157 0 -0.250* -5.82  
India 150 1.559 10 -1.478** -28.86 -1.425*** 
Indonesia 99 1.483 9 -1.181** -24.69 -1.045** 
Significant at * 10 per cent; ** 5 per cent; *** 10 per cent. 
Notes: N=sample size. N=sample size. Fixed-effects estimation of equation 1) is used in all cases. 
Sources: see Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B). 
  As posited by the conventional wisdom, the results show no integration before 1815, although they 
rely on a small and thus potentially non representative number of observations.  The data for the two 
subsequent periods are undoubtedly representative and they yield a clear conclusion: overall, 
convergence was twice faster in the “early globalization” than during its (alleged) “heyday”. The 
difference between the two periods is particularly wide for the Far East, while convergence between 
Indonesia and Europe was only 45 per cent faster in 1815-1870 than in 1870-1913. Integration of 
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Indonesia during the “early globalization” is also the only case where the two estimators yield different 
results. The negative coefficient(s) for the war and interwar period reflects the return to normal levels 
of price differentials, after the sharp war-time increase. Indeed, dropping the first five years, the rates 
become positive for the total and for all areas but the Far East. Yet the rates of inter-war disintegration 
remain relatively small and are not statistically significant.
2
 In other words, the inter-war disintegration 
of the world trading network affected little the Asian and American exports of primary products 
analyzed here.  
   The increase in the speed of reaction between the second and third periods suggests an  increase 
in market efficiency. However, this is modest and the reaction remains rather slow: one may surmise 
that in modern markets, most shocks were arbitraged away within the year and that, consequently, 
our yearly series capture only very large shocks, which needed more time to be absorbed.  This 
conjecture should be tested with higher frequency data (Brunt and Cannon 2014).  
  One might suspect the inter-temporal comparisons to be biased by composition effects as the 
coverage by product differs between periods. The absence of some bulky product from the panel 
before 1870 implies a negative bias in the pace of integration during the “twilight of mercantilism”, 
while the sample for the “heyday of globalization” includes high-value goods whose price differentials 
were already very small by 1870 and could not fall further. We address this concern by running fixed-
effect panel regression   of the natural logarithm of price ratio as a function of five year time dummies 
(Bateman 2011). 
  
                                                          
2
 The overall rate of change (in percentage) is 0.50 (not significant), while rates by area are -0.39 for the Far East (significant at 
10 per cent), 0.63 for India, 0.53 for Dutch East Indies and 0.51 for the United States (none significant).  
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Figure 2 
Long-run convergence: five year averages 
-
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Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio between import and export prices; the only independent 
variables are five years dummies. Fixed-effects estimation is used. 
Sources: see Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B). 
The results (Figure 2) confirm that if anything the linear trends understate the difference between 
1815-1870 and 1870-1913. The pattern is almost identical also if we omit non-homogenous goods 
and very similar (although statistically less precise) if we run separate regressions for the four trade 
routes. On top of this, Figure 2 shows that price convergence concentrated in fairly short periods of 
time, most notably between 1815 and 1825, in the 1850s, and in the early 1870s and the 1880s. 
Thus, we look for structural breaks in the series of price ratios with a Bai-Perron (1998, 2003) test. We 
find at least one break in twenty-three series out of twenty-nine and two or more breaks in six of them, 
for a total of 31 breaks. About a third of these breaks feature also a shift in level exceeding a third of 
the differential before the break. Table 4 sums up the results. Column 1 reminds the number of series 
by period and country (from Table 1). Columns 2 to 4 report the number of trends, distinguishing 
between periods of convergence (negative and significant coefficient of the time variable), divergence 
(positive and significant trend) and periods without a significant trend in price ratios.  The number of 
trends (sum of Columns 2 to 4) exceeds the number of pair of markets (Column 1) whenever there is 
more than one trend within a given period. Then we count the number of breaks which entail also an 
upward (Column 5) or downward (Column 6) jump exceeding 10 per cent of the last year of the 
previous trend. We estimate the total change in each period/country (Column 7) and the contribution  
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Table 5 
The four phases of globalization 
              
  
Number of trends 
 
Number of breaks 
Total change in the 
period  
Contribution of 
shocks 
Implicit rate of 
change 
  
Pairs of 
markets 
Convergence Divergence Trendless 
Upward 
shock 
Downward 
shock 
  (in percentage)   (in percentage)     (in percentage) 
Twilight of mercantilism   (1796-1815) 
       Atlantic 2 
  
2 
  
-1.10 0.00 -0.10 
India 4 
  
4 
 
 -3.50 0.00 -0.31 
All 6 
  
6 
 
 -2.70 0.00 -0.24 
Early globalization   (1815-1870) 
      Atlantic 2 1 
 
2 
 
2 -27.60 45.50 -0.45 
Far East 3 1 1 2 
 
1 -28.50 25.80 -0.79 
India 8 4 
 
5 1 5 -46.10 41.80 -1.90 
Indonesia 5 3 1 3 
 
2 -10.60 16.20 -0.47 
All 18 9 2 12 1 10 -32.50 33.39 -1.20 
Heyday globalization  (1870-1913) 
      Atlantic 2 
  
2 
  
-8.40 21.40 -0.21 
Far East 4 3 1 1 
 
1 -2.80 5.70 -0.06 
India 8 6 1 2 1 2 -19.30 22.70 -0.54 
Indonesia 6 3 
 
3 
 
2 -14.30 41.30 -0.40 
All 20 12 2 8 1 5 -13.40 24.76 -0.37 
War and interwar     (1914-1938) 
      Atlantic 2 
  
2 
  
-1.80 0.00 -0.08 
Far East 1 1 
    
-2.90 0.00 -0.12 
India 8 4 2 2 3 
 
1.80 17.50 0.28 
Indonesia 4 1 1 2 2 1 4.90 43.50 0.16 
All 15 6 3 6 5 1 1.84 20.91 0.17 
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the natural logarithm of the ratio between import and export prices; the only independent variable is the time trend. The Bai-Perron (1998, 2003) 
tests detect structural breaks in the constant and the slope. The total change and the implicit rate of change for each product in each period (Columns 7 and 9) are based on the formula Delta = (rpT- 
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Table 5-continued 
rp0)/rp0, where Delta is the total change and the rps denote the fitted values at the end and beginning of the period. As at times 
trends and shifts offset one another, to examine the extent to which cumulated changes are explained by them, we decompose 
the sum of the absolute values of the predicted changes (Chilosi 2014), using the following formula: Delta_abs=|(rpn1-
rpn0)/rpn0|+|(rpn2-rpn1)*rpn1/(rpn1*rpn0)|+|(rpn3-rpn2)*rpn2/(rpn2*rpn0)|+… where rpni changes whenever there is a shift and again with 
the new trend. In practice, there are at most two trends in each period (i.e. i=1, 2 or 3). The figures reported in Column 8 are 
based on the proportions of Delta_abs explained by the shifts. 
Sources: Chilosi and Federico (2013: table A1). 
by shocks (Column 8), by averages of product specific figures. Last but not least, we compute an 
overall trend, comparable with the linear trends of Table 4, as an average the product-specific yearly 
rates of change (Column 9). 
As a whole, our analysis confirms that convergence was consistently and significantly faster during 
the “twilight of mercantilism” than during the “heyday of globalization”, although the difference for 
Indonesia is very small. The analysis adds three important results.  First, the timing of the breaks only 
weakly supports the traditional periodization:  slightly less than half of the breaks (14 out of 31) fall 
within an interval of six years around 1815, 1870 or 1913 and almost as many (10) are farther than 
ten years from these dates. Second, breaks mattered a lot. In the “twilight of mercantilism” phase, on 
average, they accounted for one third of changes, as compared to a quarter during the “heyday” and 
a fifth during the last period. Third, the timing of the breaks often coincided with important institutional 
changes, detailed in the next section.  Almost all the major shifts, 10 out of 12, clustered around 1815 
or 1913 –, i.e. at the end of the EIC monopoly in Indian trade (1813) or at the outbreak of World War 
One.  One exception is the tea exported from Canton to London, whose price ratio saw a sudden fall 
in 1835, two years after the demise of the EIC monopoly on that route; the other one is the sugar 
exported from India, whose London price spiked up in 1839, after the ban on the import of West 
Indian sugar cultivated by slaves. Moreover, the three negative shifts around 1870 are all from 
Indonesia, where, as will be detailed in the next section, the monopoly on foreign trade was abolished 
from 1868, considerably later than in India and China.
3
 By contrast, the Great Depression was 
definitely not a shock in the market for primary products.  
 4) The causes of convergence: transport costs and barriers to trade 
The conventional wisdom attributes the fall in the transaction costs of world trade before World War 
One mostly to the combined effects of liberalization of trade and declines in transport costs; 
                                                          
3
 The remaining shift near 1870 is positive and signals a slowing down in the pace of integration of linseed between Calcutta 
and London. In fact, only in one case out of four does a structural break signal that the pace of integration increased after the 
1870s (tin from Batavia).  
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improvements in communication and the gold standard are also routinely stressed as contributory 
factors. Similarly, the disintegration after the war is seen as the product of the protectionist backlash. 
We measure transport costs with the freight factor (the ratio of freights to price at the origin, assuming 
other costs to have been proportional to freights), and explore barriers to trade by looking at the 
nominal duty on each product – i.e. the sum of import duties in consuming countries and export taxes 
from India and Indonesia divided by the price at the origin. Figure 3 plots the transport costs and the 
duties for four representative commodities. 
Figure 3 
Barriers to trade for selected commodities  
a) Transport costs (freight factors)  
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Figure 3-continued 
b) Import and export duties 
 
Notes: the freight factors are equal to the nominal freights divided by the price at the origin. Similarly, the duties are equal to the 
sum of import and export duties divided by the price at the origin. 
Sources: see Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B).   
 
 Levels are not directly comparable because the scales on the vertical axis differ, but trends are by 
and large similar across countries and products. As expected, duties and freights did fall in the first 
part of the 19
th
 century, while, consistent with the results of Table 5, the rise in protection during the 
Great Depression is very limited.  From 1930 to 1938, total duties were on average equivalent to 26.8 
per cent of the price in the exporting country, exceeding 50 per cent in 22 observations out of 95 
(most of them on sugar).  A fortiori, the impact of protection was limited over the whole period 1796-
1938: total duties exceeded 5 per cent of prices in slightly more than a quarter of cases and 50 per 
cent only in about an eighth. On the same line, one should note that most of the fall in freights was 
over by 1875 and that the change was often quite sudden. The 75 per cent collapse in the freight 
factor for saltpetre in 1816-1817 is an extreme case, but there are several other instances of major 
jumps, including a 70 per cent fall in freights for tea from China to England in 1835.  Such sudden 
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changes cannot be accounted for by innovations in shipping organization or technology, the two 
competing explanations for the fall in costs of sea transport (North, 1968; Harley, 1988; Shah and 
Williamson, 2004), which by their nature are likely to spread gradually. Thus the evidence points to a 
major role for the dismantling of the institutional barriers to Asian trade.  
   In Japan and China, these barriers were erected also by national governments to be dismantled by 
the force of Western powers: Japan was forced to open to trade in 1854, while the restrictions to 
Western merchants in China to trade in Canton only were lifted after the two opium wars in 1842 and 
1858 (Dermigny 1964, Fairbank 1978, Wakeman 1978).  The British East India Company (EIC) 
enjoyed a monopoly on exports of Chinese tea to the United Kingdom and of imports of Indian opium 
into China until 1833, when it ceased all its mercantile activities. The monopoly of trade between its 
Indian possessions and the United Kingdom had been already abolished in July 1813. The Company 
had traditionally paid very high freights, because it used large and heavily manned and armed ships 
(Indiamen), very expensive to build and operate, which it rented from the owners. These were a small 
group of Londoners, many of whom were also shareholders of the Company. Although the owners 
were barred from participation in the Court of Directors since 1710, they infiltrated it with the ships’ 
husbands and captains, thus forming a cohesive oligopoly within the monopoly.  According to the 
conventional wisdom, the “shipping interest”, as it was known at the time, allowed the inflating of costs 
and thus the circumvention of the Company’s official charter, which prevented it from earning extra-
profits from trade (Wakeman 1978, Mui and Mui 1984: 63-64, Bowen 2006: 252-256, Webster 2009: 
32-40).
4
 Solar (2013) has recently suggested that the Indiamen were necessary to stave off the 
military threat of competing Western trading companies. In his view freights collapsed in the 1810s 
thanks to the combined effect of technical progress (mostly copper sheathing) and to the successes 
of the Royal Navy, which made it possible to use smaller and cheaper ships. Anyway, since 1813 
trade with India was free and in all likelihood the market was competitive. The expectation of great 
profits from liberalized trade caused a glut in the market for transportation for India (Webster 2009: 
72) and indeed our series of freight collapses in 1817. 
  The Dutch trade with its colonies in the Indian Ocean had been a monopoly of the Vereenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie from the early 17th century to its bankruptcy in the 1790s. Trade remained free 
                                                          
4
 The EIC charter stipulated that the price of company wares in London “should not exceed the prime cost, the freight and 
charges of importation, the lawful interest of capital from the time of arrival of such tea in Britain, and the common premium in 
insurance" (Mui and Mui 1984: ix). Indeed, the official profits of the Company were quite low (Wakeman 1978: 167). 
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until 1825, when a monopoly on commerce with the Netherlands was granted to a new trading 
company, the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, or NHM (Furnivall 1976, Horlings 1995: 142). 
Similarly to the EIC, the company rented ships from Dutch owners, at “exceptionally high” rates 
(Korthals Altes 1994: 161, Horlings 1995: 145). In its first years of activity, exports were reduced by a 
rebellion of natives, the so called Java War. At the end of the war, the Dutch government, desperate 
for revenues, established a system of compulsory delivery of coffee, sugar and indigo for exports, 
known as Cultivation System (de Klerck 1938, Dobbin 1983, Fasseur 1992, Houben 2002, van 
Zanden and Marks 2012).  Peasants were paid much less than the world market price – about a half 
of the Batavia price for coffee (Fasseur 1992: 37). The goods were transported to Amsterdam, and 
there sold at auction: the profits, net of a fee for the NHM, accrued to the Dutch government. The 
amount was very substantial: at its peak, in the 1850s, it accounted for over half the state revenues 
and for about 3.8 per cent of Dutch GDP excluding any hidden subsidy to Dutch shipping and industry 
(Smits et al. 2000, van Zanden and van Riel 2004). However, the Cultivation System was increasingly 
unpopular at home and was slowly phased out. In 1850, the NHM liberalized the bidding contracts for 
renting ships and its monopoly was abolished altogether in 1868 (NHM 1924: 23, Furnivall 1976: 168, 
Korthals Altes 1994).  The Dutch trade with the colonies remained free  until 1918,  when the sugar 
producers set up a private association (VJSP) to allocate the scarce available shipping (van der Eng 
1996: 215-216, Knight 2010). The organization continued to manage sugar exports after the end of 
the war, and in 1932 it was substituted by a governmental organization (NIVAS) to manage sugar 
production quotas under the international agreement (van der Eng 1996: 224-226).  The Great 
Depression featured also the first intervention in American agriculture: the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(AAA), part of the New Deal policies, established a loan facility for cotton farmers, which in practice 
set a minimum price of cotton since 1934 (Federico and Sharp 2013).  
 
5) The causes of integration: an econometric analysis 
  As implied by the preceding discussion, the ratio of prices for the i-th good (RPit) at time t can be 
explained by the barriers to trade (B), the efficiency of markets (Em) and the transport costs (Tc)  
Log RPit=F(B, Em, Tc)       2) 
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 In our regression the set B includes the total duties (LOG_DUTY) and dummies for monopolies - a 
dummy for the  EIC (1796 to 1816) and  separate dummies for the NHM under the full monopoly 
regime (NHM1), from 1824 to 1850, and for the partially liberalized one (NHM2) from 1851 to 1868.
5
  
We also add dummies for the AAA support to American cotton prices (since 1933) and for the two 
marketing boards for Javanese sugar, the private VJSP (1918 to 1931) and the public NIVAS (after 
1932). We expect duties and monopolies to increase price ratios, while the interventions on the 
commodity market may augment or reduce price gaps according to the details of the policies.  
   Arguably the most important contribution to increasing market efficiency was the connection by 
telegraph, which cut the time to transmit information from weeks to few minutes (Hoag 2006). The 
cable between the United Kingdom and the United States was operational since 1866, and it was 
followed four years later by the line to India and around 1875 by the line between Europe and 
Indonesia (Headrick 1988: 101). We expect the TELEGRAPH dummy to be negative. We also add 
dummies for a number of political events which may have disrupted the orderly working of markets, 
such as the Java War in 1825-1827 (JAVA WAR), the Indian Mutiny in 1857-1859 (MUTINY), the 
American Civil War (CIVIL WAR), the anti-slavery campaign, which boycotted Caribbean sugar, in 
1840-1845 (SLAVE) and World War I (WWI).  
   By definition, the actual freights, the numerator of our measure of transport costs (LOG_FREIGHT), 
include any rent paid to privileged Dutch or British ship-owners under the NHM and EIC monopoly 
system. Consequently the EIC and NHM dummies measure only any additional effect of the trading 
monopoly – e.g. from a manipulation of the market. We try to capture the total effect of monopoly, 
including the rents to ship-owners by using an alternative series of freight factor 
(LOG_FREIGHT_ADJ) net of the rents to shippers. We obtain this series (Figure 4) by scaling down 
the actual series with coefficients from a fixed-effect panel regression, which explains freights with 
dummies for the NHM and the EIC. By construction, the series move in parallel to LOG_FREIGHT, 
except in the final year of the monopoly and thus the substitution affects the coefficient of transport 
costs only marginally. 
                                                          
5
 The variable LOG_DUTY is computed as log(1+t), where t is the ratio of (usually specific) duties to the price  in the producing 
country. It is thus zero if t=0. The dummy EIC is equal to 1 until 1816.  We do not add a specific dummy for the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars because it would be collinear with the EIC dummy and it might bias the estimate of its coefficient. Anyway, 
price gaps with Asia in Britain were much less affected than in continental Europe by the Napoleonic Wars (O’Rourke 2006).  
18 
 
  
19 
 
Figure 4 
Freight factors and adjusted freight factors: selected commodities 
i) Saltpetre Calcutta London
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Notes: The freight factor is the nominal freight rate divided by the price at the origin. The adjusted freight series are constructed 
by firstly running the regression LOG_FREIGHTit=c +αi+β1EICit+β2NHM1it+β3NHM2it+εit and secondly using the equation 
LOG_FREIGHT_ADJit=LOG_FREIGHTit-(β1EICit+β2NHM1it+β3NHM2it). Using alternative specifications, like including a time 
trend, yielded qualitatively identical results and only small quantitative differences. 
Sources: see the text and Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B). 
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 We add the lagged value of the dependent variable to reduce auto-correlation and to take into 
account the possible delay in adjustment to shocks, but its omission does not affect qualitatively the 
results. The coefficients are thus short term elasticities; long run elasticities can be computed as βk/(1-
γ) where βk is the coefficient of the k-th variable and  γ is the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable. 
  The descriptive statistics for all variables and the pairwise coefficient of correlation between them do 
not add much new information (Chilosi and Federico 2013). The correlation between explicative 
variables is in general very low and thus there is no risk of multi-collinearity. On the other hand, most 
variables are clearly non-stationary (cf. Chilosi and Federico 2013: Table A2, for a formal testing) and 
thus results might be spurious. We therefore test ex-post the stationarity of the residuals with a Levin 
et al. (2002) test for panel regressions. 
  Our analysis omits from the regression the Far Eastern markets, because the series are very short 
and their quality is comparatively poor. This leaves a total of 22 cross-sections and 1568 observation. 
As said before, we cannot categorically exclude that quality may be an issue for wheat (both from the 
United States and from India), coffee sugar, pepper and tin (all from Indonesia). Thus, in Column 3 of 
Table 6 we drop these products, reducing the coverage to 16 products and 1020 observations. Last 
but not least, Indian trade, with 838 observations, is overrepresented in the sample. We address this 
issue in two different ways. First, we run the regression with a restricted panel, featuring two products 
per route (wheat and cotton for the United States, sugar e indigo for India, and pepper and sugar for 
Indonesia), and we weight each of them  with their share of the value of imports on that route. Thus, 
in this specification (Table 6, Column 6), each route has the same weight on the results. Second, we 
simply run separate regressions for the United States (Table 6, Column 7) India (Column 8) and 
Indonesia (Column 9), which supply additional insights on the different causes of integration.  
All regressions use fixed-effects specification with panel corrected standard errors to address cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity (reflecting different levels of transaction costs) and contemporaneous 
correlation (which may arise from common shocks).  Although we report results of an OLS estimate 
(Tab 6, Column 1) for comparative purposes, we prefer to use instrumental variables because prices 
in the exporting country appear in the denominator of the dependent variable and of two explicative  
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Table 6 
 
The causes of integration 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  PCSE PCSE/IV PCSE/IV PCSE/IV PCSE/IV PCSE/IV PCSE/IV PCSE/IV PCSE/IV 
C 0.517 0.365 0.327 0.366 0.329 0.224 0.312 0.386 0.416 
 
(17.18)*** (8.73)*** (5.53)*** (8.73)*** (7.92)*** (4.48)*** (4.93)*** (5.51)*** (6.84)*** 
LOG_DUTY 0.084 0.051 0.048 0.051 0.033 0.039 0.13 0.021 0.057 
 
(3.64)*** (2.03)** (0.87) (2.04)** (1.28) (1.31) (2.75)*** (0.32) (1.54) 
EIC 0.173 0.236 0.253 0.345 0.287 0.347 
 
0.343 
 
 
(5.05)*** (6.30)*** (5.66)*** (9.98)*** (7.38)*** (7.04)*** 
 
(9.12)*** 
 NHM1 -0.105 -0.044 -0.021 0.054 0.021 0.078 
  
0.137 
 
(-4.48)*** (-1.68)* (-0.22) (2.26)** (0.74) (2.37)** 
  
(4.83)*** 
NHM2 -0.07 -0.046 0.013 0.023 -0.022 0.049 
  
0.087 
 
(-3.42)*** (-2.26)** (0.34) (1.04) (-1.05) (1.50) 
  
(3.43)*** 
AAA 0.038 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.02 0.018 0.012 
  
 
(0.79) (0.69) (0.67) (0.69) (0.46) (0.25) (0.28) 
  VJSP -0.079 -0.035 
 
-0.035 -0.011 -0.011 
  
-0.031 
 
(-2.08)** (-0.90) 
 
(-0.90) (-0.28) (-0.24) 
  
(-0.78) 
NIVAS -0.185 -0.125 
 
-0.126 -0.105 -0.105 
  
-0.153 
 
(-3.61)*** (-2.35)** 
 
(-2.35)** (-1.93)* (-1.60) 
  
(-2.83)*** 
LOG_FREIGHT 0.123 0.067 0.053 
  
 
0.085 
  
 
(13.27)*** (4.64)*** (2.48)** 
  
 
(3.65)*** 
  LOG_FREIGHT_ADJ 
   
0.067 
 
0.034 
 
0.068 0.073 
    
(4.64)*** 
 
(2.01)** 
 
(2.64)*** (4.44)*** 
LOG_FREIGHT*LIGHT 
    
0.033 
 
   
     
(2.14)** 
 
   LOG_FREIGHT*BULKY 
    
0.108 
 
   
     
(6.73)*** 
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Table 6-continued          
TELEGRAPH -0.043 -0.082 -0.095 -0.081 -0.083 -0.076 -0.017 -0.117 -0.046 
 
(-2.57)** (-4.31)*** (-3.63)*** (-4.31)*** (-4.45)*** (-3.75)*** (-0.74) (-3.32)*** (-2.01)** 
JAVA_WAR 0.064 0.063 
 
0.063 0.072 0.071 
  
0.066 
 
(0.83) (0.80) 
 
(0.80) (0.89) (0.86) 
  
(0.82) 
MUTINY -0.071 -0.066 -0.068 -0.066 -0.085 -0.060 
 
-0.094 
 
 
(-0.82) (-0.75) (-0.76) (-0.75) (-0.99) (-0.47) 
 
(-1.06) 
 SLAVE 0.239 0.195 0.285 0.195 0.189 0.139 
 
0.293 0.148 
 
(5.62)*** (4.41)*** (4.91)*** (4.41)*** (4.20)*** (2.70)*** 
 
(4.98)*** (2.38)** 
CIVIL_WAR -0.009 -0.055 -0.08 -0.055 -0.085 -0.082 -0.006 
  
 
(-0.26) (-1.47) (-1.35) (-1.46) (-2.25)** (-1.61) (-0.15) 
  WWI*ATLANTIC -0.067 0.012 0.033 0.012 0.048 0.044 -0.034 
  
 
(-1.23) (0.21) (0.55) (0.21) (0.92) (0.62) (-0.58) 
  WWI*INDIA 0.087 0.151 0.167 0.151 0.144 0.086 
 
0.152 
 
 
(2.08)** (3.40)*** (3.40)*** (3.40)*** (3.32)*** (1.14) 
 
(2.93)*** 
 WWI*INDONESIA 0.171 0.212 0.181 0.212 0.242 0.278 
  
0.227 
 
(5.67)*** (6.59)*** (4.34)*** (6.58)*** (7.09)*** (4.85)*** 
  
(7.27)*** 
LOG_RATIO1 0.445 0.497 0.513 0.496 0.463 0.452 0.503 0.51 0.338 
 
(17.77)*** (18.00)*** (15.80)*** (18.00)*** (16.52)*** (12.11)*** (8.70)*** (14.90)*** (7.86)*** 
      
 
   N 1534 1534 1020 1534 1534 619 231 821 482 
Adjusted R-squared 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.64 0.76 0.79 0.76 
F 153.67*** 129.36*** 120.24*** 129.37*** 129.61*** 49.38*** 77.07*** 133.66*** 76.88*** 
LLC t-stat -33.12*** -37.82*** -32.65*** -37.82*** -37.65*** -22.88*** -16.25*** -28.45*** -20.65*** 
Exogeneity chi-squared test 
 
24.82*** 22.79*** 24.85*** 30.43*** 10.97*** 7.85** 20.20*** 7.70** 
Exogeneity F test 
 
12.90*** 12.90*** 12.83*** 11.31*** 3.81** 7.89*** 12.23*** 3.95** 
Shea's partial R-squared 1st inst. 
 
0.89 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.75 0.96 0.94 0.74 
Shea's partial R-squared 2nd inst. 
 
0.46 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.32 0.41 0.45 0.44 
Shea's partial R-squared 3rd inst.         0.6         
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Table 6-continued  
Significant at * 10 per cent; ** 5 per cent; *** 1 per cent. 
Notes: PCSE=panel corrected standard errors; IV=instrumental variables estimation; N=sample size; inst.=instrument. The 
dependent variable in each regression is the natural logarithm of the ratio between import and export prices. Fixed-effects 
estimation with panel corrected standard errors is used in all cases; instrumental variable estimation for specifications (2) to (9); 
weighted least squares estimation for specification (6). Specification (3) includes only homogeneous goods; specification (6) 
includes only two goods per route; specifications (7) to (9) include only goods exported from the U.S., India and Indonesia, 
respectively. 
Sources: see Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B).    
ones (duties and freights). Furthermore, freights might be endogenous in the short-run as well, if the 
supply of shipping on those routes were inelastic (Jacks and Pendakur 2010). Specifically, we 
instrument LOG_DUTY with the ratio of yearly duties to the average price throughout the whole period 
– so that within variations depend only on the exogenous changes in specific duties. Likewise we use 
average prices as denominator of the instrument for LOG_FREIGHT, while the numerator is the trend 
component of a Hodrick-Prescott decomposition of the series of nominal freights.  
The overall performance of the model is good. The residuals are stationary; the combined variables 
are highly significant (F-test) and explain about four fifths of the total variance. Almost all the signs 
agree with expectations. In all cases, the Wooldridge’s (1995) and the regression-based tests find 
strong evidence of that the OLS estimates sufficiently differ from the instrumental variables’ ones to 
recommend the use of the latter. All first stage tests find that the instruments are highly correlated 
with the variables, so that the expected small-sample bias is low.  Turning to the results:      
i) As expected, the coefficients for freights are positive, highly significant and robust to the substitution 
of monopoly-adjusted series (LOG_ ADJFREIGHT). A 10 per cent increase in freights augmented 
price gaps by about 0.6-0.9 per cent in the short run and by about 1-1.5 per cent in the long run.   
Moreover, as expected, the impact of costs is much bigger for bulky goods than for than for light 
products; over three times, in fact (Column 5).
6
  
ii) The variable LOG_DUTY is positive and significant in the baseline specification and its coefficient is 
similar to the coefficient of freights. Indeed, the averages of the two variables are almost identical:  
18.1 per cent for the freight factor and 18.2 per cent (17 per cent on imports and 1.2 per cent on 
exports) for duties. Duties were high only on wheat, under the British Corn Laws before 1846, and 
                                                          
6
 We run an OLS regression with LOG_FREIGHT as dependent variable, explained by a linear trend and by route and product 
dummies. The product dummies yield a ranking of commodities from the lightest to the heaviest (silk, indigo, tin, cotton, tea, 
coffee, pepper, rubber, sugar, wheat, jute, saltpetre, linseed, rapeseed, and rice). We define ‘light’ the first nine products 
(“light”) and ‘bulky’ the others: this distinction closely mirrors the conventional one between “grain and seeds” and “lighter 
goods”.  
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sugar. In fact, the coefficient of LOG_DUTY is high and significant for the Atlantic trade (Column 7), 
low and significant only at the 13 per cent level for Indonesia (Column 9) and very low and not 
significant for India (Column 8).  
iii) As expected, the monopoly of the British East India Company widened the price differentials, by a 
quarter in the baseline specification with LOG_FREIGHT (Column 2) and by more than a third 
(corresponding to a 70 per cent increase in the long run) if we add the effect of monopoly on freights 
(Columns 4 and 7). In contrast, the NHM apparently fostered convergence both before (NHM1) and 
after 1850 (NHM2). This effect however disappears if we use the monopoly-adjusted series of freights 
(Columns 4 and 8). The NHM dummies become positive and significant, although the coefficients are 
less than a quarter of the EIC one. In short, the NHM affected negatively long-range integration only 
because it charged high freights, while it may have even increased the efficiency of the market, by 
improving the transmission of information and by reducing the risks.
7
 In contrast, the monopoly of the 
EIC harmed trade even discounting the effect on freights. The overall effect of state intervention after 
World War One seems modest. Neither the Dutch (private) marketing board (VJSP) in the 1920s nor 
the support to American agriculture after the Great Depression (AAA) affected significantly integration. 
Only the Dutch public marketing board (the NIVAS) had a positive impact, reducing price gaps 
between Indonesia and Europe by 10-15 per cent.  
v) The variable TELEGRAPH is negative as expected and significant in all specifications.
8
  We have 
tried to interact it with a time trend to capture the effect of technical progress and increases in 
transmission (or changes in policy to set rates), but the results are poor. Our results confirm the 
earlier work by Lew and Cater (2006) on the positive effect of telegraph on world trade.  
vi)The political shocks in producing countries seem not to have affected international price 
differentials, although of course they may have had important consequences in producing areas. In 
contrast the campaign against slave-produced sugar in the United Kingdom (SLAVE) had a massive 
                                                          
7
 An official history of the Company offers an alternative explanation of the negative signs in the baseline specifications: it 
claims that the NHM sold at a loss to help Dutch middlemen to be competitive on the European market (NHM 1924: 18-19). 
8
We have tested separately three additional measures of efficiency: time trends, total traded quantity and a dummy for fixed 
exchange rates between countries (i.e. the gold standard). All variables are expected negative. More trade should increase the 
flow of information, fixed exchange rates should reduce the risks of trading and time trends should capture all other 
improvements. The trends are significant only in Indonesia, but the variable is unexpectedly positive – i.e. ceteris paribus 
markets have been disintegrating. The quantity variable is negative, but it worsens the overall results of the regression 
(available upon request), probably because of endogeneity issues. The dummy for fixed exchange rate is incorrectly signed but 
not significant. Evidently, more refined measures of exchange rate volatility than afforded by the available data are needed to 
adequately capture the effect of exchange rate risk. The time trend is positive and significant for Indonesia – i.e. efficiency 
would have decreased, ceteris paribus. We speculate that the coefficient reflects the increasing exposure to price shocks 
originating in other markets. 
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effect on the sugar market.  The dummies for WWI are positive and significant, as expected, for India 
and Indonesia but not for the Atlantic. We interpret them as the effect of disruption in the market on 
top of war-related increase in transport costs, which should already be captured by the variable 
LOG_FREIGHT.  
 How much did each variable contribute to long run convergence?  To answer, in Table 7 we report 
the share of the total change accounted for by each variable.  
Table 7 
The causes of integration: decomposition analysis (in percentage) 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sample All All All All Atlantic India Indonesia 
Years 1816-1913 1816-1870 1871-1913 1816-1913 1816-1913 1815-1913 1849-1913 
        EIC 39.27 49.57 
 
57.25 
 
69.14 
 NHM1 
      
43.36 
LOG_DUTY 4.65 5.56 1.14 4.65 42.11 1.72 2.98 
LOG_FREIGHT 34.74 42.3 59.48 
 
82.49 
  LOG_FREIGHT_ADJ 
  
16.79 
 
8.16 24.99 
TELEGRAPH 20.34 15.8 37.3 20.31 13.08 23.47 14.6 
        Total 98.99 113.24 97.92 98.99 137.68 102.5 85.92 
        Notes: all the decompositions report the share of the percentage change in the dependent variable accounted for by each 
independent variable and are based on the results of the panel analysis presented in Table 6. Columns (1) to (3) are based on 
the second specification, Column (4) is based on the fourth specification, and Columns (5) to (8) are based on the seventh, 
eighth and ninth specifications, respectively. The exact starting date differs somewhat across samples in order to maximise the 
number of covered goods. We omit explicative variables which did not affect the dependent variables at the beginning and/or at 
the end of the period (such as the World War dummies). The cumulated change in the dependent variable is obtained as the 
average of the differences between the values fitted by the panel at time 0 and that of time T divided by the former.   
Sources: see the text and Chilosi and Federico (2013: Appendix B). 
 
  As the last row of Table 7 shows, the model performs very well: the divergence between the 
cumulated effect of the variables and the actual change is less than 5 per cent in four cases and 
exceeds 20 per cent only in the Atlantic trade. Most of the total convergence is explained by changes 
in transportation costs and by the abolition of the EIC, which looms large in the long run analysis, 
partly because the majority of observations in 1815 refer to India.
9
 According to the baseline 
specification (Column 1), the fall in freights mattered almost as much, but this conclusion is decidedly 
changed if we use the coefficient from LOG_FREIGHT_ADJS (Column 4).  The NHM does not appear 
                                                          
9
 But even if we give each route equal weight (i.e. using the sixth specification from table 6), the EIC emerges as by far the 
most important factor, accounting for over 45 per cent of the overall decline. 
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among the variables in the aggregate analysis, because the series for Indonesia start later, but as 
Column 7 shows, it played a very important role in the convergence of prices between the colony and 
Europe, too. The telegraph did help a lot as well, accounting for between a sixth and a quarter of long-
run price convergence. In contrast, the cut in duties contributed substantially to the integration only in 
the Atlantic economy (Column 5). The separate estimates by period (Columns 2 and 3) highlight the 
sharp differences in the causes of integration. The “early globalization” was mostly determined by the 
trade liberalization and the abolition of monopolies, while further convergence during the “heyday of 
globalization” was achieved thanks to the lay-out of the telegraph lines and to fall in sea-borne 
transport costs. On the whole, political decisions mattered more in the long run because, as shown in 
section four, most of total convergence pre-dated 1870. 
8) Conclusion 
Our results are relevant for two literatures, that on market integration and that on trade and growth in 
Asia, which, although clearly related, have so far remained largely distinct.  Our work contributes to 
filling in gaps in the literature on global market integration, strengthening the emerging consensus 
view in the literature on Europe and the Atlantic trade.  The process started early in the 19
th
 century 
and it was determined to a large extent by institutional changes. Within Europe and between Europe 
and North America, barriers were raised essentially by protectionist trade policies, while commerce 
with Asia was hampered by the monopoly of Western trading companies. These barriers were 
progressively abolished and, at least for the sample of products/routes we are considering, were only 
partially re-instated during the Great Depression. Once trade was free from institutional constraints, 
further convergence was mainly achieved by cutting transportation costs. The cost of sea-borne trade, 
however, was fairly low already at the beginning of the 19
th
 century and thus the scope for further 
convergence was limited.
10
 These findings are consistent with the view that market integration was at 
the root of the terms of trade boom experienced by Asian countries in the decades before 1870.
11
 
Future research should systematically assess this impact and examine the implications of market 
integration for trade and welfare.   
                                                          
10
 In contrast, transport costs from the producing areas to the ports were surely high and indeed there is a strong evidence of 
growing integration in the second half of the 19
th
 century in the domestic market in the United States (Federico and Sharp, 
2013), in India (Hurd1975,  Studer  2008, Andrabi and Kuehlwein 2010) and also in the Dutch East Indies (Marks 2010; van 
Zanden and Marks 2012: 25-26). Indeed, in a recent paper, Donaldson (2014) estimates that on average trade created by 
railways increased Indian GDP by as much as a sixth from 1870 to 1930. 
11
 This is particularly so as new estimates of terms of trade show that India took part in this boom, too (Chilosi and Federico 
2013: 8). 
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